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RevieW's
The Review Section of E&A consists of three parts. The first is made up of brief reviews
of books and articles (and perhaps films etc.) which are concerned in some way with the
rights and wrongs of human treatment of non-human animals. These reviews will be both
critical and reportive--primarily reportive in the case of most scientific and historical
material, and increasingly critical as the material is more argumentative and philosophical.
The second part of this Section is entitled 'Second Opinions' and contains second (and
usually dissenting) reviews of works reviewed in the first part in earlier numbers of E&A.
After a review appears in E&A (and after the 'second opinion' if one appears within the-
the-next two numbers) the Editor will invite the author of the original work to submit a brief
rejoinder to the review(s). Rejoinders received will appear in the third part of the
Review Section. Members of the SSEA who wish to submit reviews (first or second), or
recommend works for review, should contact the Editor.

Books

GOODMAN, LENN EVAN (TRANS,), THE CASE OF TijE
ANIMALS VERSUS MAN BEFORE THE KING OF THE JINN
(BOSTON: TWAYNE) 1978.
This book is a philosophical curiosity: .a
tenth-century Arabic ecological fable runn~ng
about 150 pages. Goodman, the tra~slator, .
provides another hundred pages of ~ntroduct7on
and notes,
notes in which we encounter such surP7~ses
surpr~ses
as a comparison
comp~rison between the Case of the Animals
An~mals
and Peter Sin~er's argument, in ANII1AL

LIBERATION, that factory-farm conditions
frustrate animals' innate natures and desires.
"Here the fundamental liberal assumption is
placed on its naturalistic basis--that all
creatures should be left to do what comes
naturally to them, since the natural incli
inclinations naturally lead to what is most whole
wholesome and advantageous for a creature, and
thus a life according to unhmapered natural
inclination is assumed (romantically) to
be the best kind of life." This is not in
fact correct as an account of the position
held by Singer and other "contemporary
defenders of animal rights." Singer's
argument is that animals have unlearned
desires which are frustrated under factory
factoryfarm conditions, causing suffering; the
fundamental assumption here is not that all
creatures should be left to do what comes
naturally to them (though of course one
miggt believe that), but that suffering
is ad.
In Goodman's long introduction we encounter
Kant, in the midst of a discussion of the
fable's mystical ecology. Goodman correctly
notes that "from the [Kantianl notion that
the moral law commands the creation of a
kingdom of ends it does not follow that
only persons can be objects of moral treat
treatment", though I doubt that "the argument
extends to plants and inanimate objects as
well as to animals." The central moral
concept in the fable, according to Goodman,
is "the concept that every animal species
and in a way every animal individual is
an end in itself (despite the fact that none
is a moral subject or in a human sense a
conscious subj ect) through. . . the
possibility of human subjects projecting
themselves into any creature's position."
Goodman discusses Darwin, Maimonides, Spinoza,
Plutarch, Descartes, Plato, Mary Midgley
and many others whose ideas he belives can be
usefully compared to those in this work. The
fable itself is often charming and sometimes
wise. Anyone who enjoyed Stephen R. L. Clark's
THE MORAL STATUS OF &~IXALS would, I expect,
enjoy this book, though it is obviously not
essential reading for philosophers.
Edward Johnson
University of New Orleans

